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Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 6, No. 2, February 2011, pp. 176–185 Relative thinking in consumer choice between differentiated goods and services and its implications for business strategy The article shows that when people consider differentiated goods or services that differ in price and quality, they exhibit a decision-making bias of “relative thinking”: relative price differences affect them even when economic theorysuggests that only absolute price differences matter. This result is obtained in four different consumption categories.
Sometimes subjects are affected only by relative price differences (“full relative thinking”) and sometimes also byabsolute price differences (“partial relative thinking”). This behavior has implications for various disciplines, and it isparticularly relevant in models dealing with horizontal or vertical differentiation, optimal pricing, competitive strategy,or advertising.
Keywords: relative thinking; consumer behavior; product differentiation; judgment and decision making.
tion. The reduction in wealth following the purchase ofthe high-quality good is related to the absolute price dif- One of the most common decision problems that con- ference between the goods, and not to the relative price sumers face is choosing between differentiated goods or services that differ in their quality and price. Such situ- The result of this idea is that, absent wealth effects, the ations exist in almost any category of goods or services, good’s price should not affect the willingness to pay for ranging from the choice of cheese or a hotel room to the a given quality improvement. The principle that only ab- choice of a car or a house. For almost any purchase de- solute price differences should matter in such consumer cision we make, we have several alternatives, and usu- decisions follows from rational utility maximization and ally these alternatives differ in their quality and price.
is an unchallenged assumption in the theoretical literature This implies that understanding how consumers choose in economics on product differentiation (both vertical and between differentiated goods is of great importance.
horizontal). Tirole (1988, p. 96), for example, models When a consumer wants to buy one unit of a good and vertical product differentiation (differentiation where one he has to choose between two differentiated goods, eco- good is clearly better than the other—but is also more nomic theory suggests that the absolute price difference expensive) using a framework in which the consumer’s matters while the relative price difference does not. This surplus when buying a good with quality s at price p is is because the opportunity cost of obtaining the higher θs−p. It follows that when the consumer faces two differ- quality (by purchasing the more expensive good) comes entiated goods, he prefers good 1 if θs1 − p1 > θs2 − p2, from the reduced wealth that is left for other consump- or equivalently, if θ(s1 − s2) > p1 − p2. It is easy tosee that this expression involves the absolute price differ- I thank the Editor Jon Baron and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. I am also grateful to David Balan, seminar par- ence (p1 − p2) but not the relative price difference (e.g., ticipants at the University of Copenhagen, the Interdisciplinary Cen- (p1 − p2)/p1 or (p1 − p2)/p2). Additional examples that ter Herzliya and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and conference illustrate that economics models assume that only abso- participants in the 22nd Israel Economic Association Annual Confer- lute price differences matter are models of horizontal dif- ence, the 33rd EARIE Annual Conference, the 2006 ESA EuropeanRegional Meeting, the Affect, Motivation and Decision Making Interna- ferentiation (horizontal differentiation exists when there tional Conference in the Dead Sea, the 2007 ESA Asia-Pacific Regional is no clear advantage of one good over the other in terms Meeting and the 2009 ESA European Regional Meeting for helpful of quality, and different customers have different prefer- comments. Financial support from the Russell Sage Foundation and the ences between them), such as the linear city (Hotelling, Phillipe Monaster Center for Economic Research at Ben-Gurion Uni-versity of the Negev is gratefully acknowledged. I thank Michal Barry, 1929) or the circular city (Salop, 1979). In these two sem- Michal Baruch, Galit Dori, Tom Harel, and Tamar Kugler for valuable inal articles, and others that followed them, the absolute price difference between the differentiated goods is again ∗Department of Business Administration, Guilford Glazer Faculty of Business and Management, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, crucial, but the relative price difference plays no role in P.O.B. 653, Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel. Email: [email protected].
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 6, No. 2, February 2011 Despite the widespread use of the assumption that only ity theory, was supported. Grewal and Marmorstein sug- absolute price differences matter when choosing between gest that the psychological utility that consumers derive differentiated goods, however, it is not clear whether peo- from saving a certain amount is inversely related to the ple indeed behave according to this principle. A related good’s price. Darke et al. (1995) examine consumer price issue is discussed in the literature that deals with how search and find that consumers used the percentage dis- the trade-off between time and money changes as prices count as a heuristic cue to help decide whether a better change. Thaler (1980), for example, conjectures that peo- price was likely to be available elsewhere when the ini- ple exert more effort to save $5 on a $25 radio than to save tial base price of the item was low, but not when it was $5 on a $500 TV.1 Later, in line with Thaler’s conjec- high. Heath et al. (1995) are interested in how consumers ture, several experimental studies found that people are perceive changes in a good’s price. They examine the ef- more willing to invest a certain time in order to save a fects of percentage-based frames on price perceptions and constant dollar amount when the good’s price is lower.
preferences for multiple price changes (price increases Tversky and Kahneman (1981), for example, asked sub- on one good together with price reductions on a sec- jects whether they would be willing to drive 20 minutes to ond good). They report that mental accounting principles save $5 on a calculator in a hypothetical scenario where generally prevailed in the absence of percentage-based they were told that they wanted to purchase a calculator frames, and that mental accounting principles, price per- and a jacket. 68% of the subjects were willing to drive 20 ception and reference dependence are sensitive to how minutes to save $5 on a $15 calculator (when they also deviations from reference states are framed.
were hypothetically buying a $125 jacket), but only 29% Baron (1997) reports that subjects were less willing to chose to do so when the $5 saving was on a $125 cal- pay for government medical insurance for diseases when culator (and they also were hypothetically buying a $15 the number of people who could not be cured was higher, holding constant the number who could be cured. In an- Tversky and Kahneman’s result was later replicated in other experiment he found that the description of risk several other studies. Mowen and Mowen (1986) showed in terms of percentage or the number of lives saved did that the effect holds similarly for student subjects and for not affect the willingness to pay for risk reduction, even business managers subjects. Frisch (1993) demonstrated though subjects knew that the risks differed in preva- that the effect holds also when only a calculator is being lence. Baron suggests that these results can be explained purchased, and Ranyard and Abdel-Nabi (1993) varied in terms of a general tendency to confuse proportions and the price of the jacket and obtained similar results. Darke differences. Fetherstonhaugh et al. (1997) find that an in- and Freedman (1993) found in one experiment that per- tervention saving a fixed number of lives was judged sig- centage off played no role on effort to save money, but in nificantly more beneficial when fewer lives were at risk a second experiment with a greater range of percentages that could be saved they found that the percentage dis- DelVecchio (2005) finds that deal-prone consumers are count had an effect on consumer choice. Azar (in press) sensitive to the value of a promotion relative to other used nine different prices and five different goods and available promotions only in a condition of high abso- elicited the exact price for which the subject is indiffer- lute dollar savings. Bartel (2006) presents scenarios that ent between the two stores (one requiring him to spend include a tradeoff between absolute and relative savings, 20 more minutes). This allowed him to estimate that the for example saving more human or animal lives versus compensation people require for the effort of going to the saving a larger proportion of a population. Choices were remote other store is roughly proportional to the square driven by both the absolute and relative savings. Maxi- mizing relative savings at the expense of absolute savings Other studies that address related issues include Gre- is non-normative, and most subjects agree with this argu- wal and Marmorstein (1994), who test two possible ex- ment upon reflection. Svenson (2008) shows that people planations why consumers’ willingness to engage in price consider ratios that are irrelevant also in decisions about search does not increase with the price dispersion. The which option can save more time (e.g., in saving travel- first potential explanation was that consumers underes- ling time in road traffic or saving doctors’ time in reorga- timate the market price dispersion, and it was not sup- nizing clinics). Kogut and Beyth-Marom (2008) ask sub- ported. The second explanation, which is based on We- jects to rate the importance of two pieces of information, ber’s law of psychophysics and Thaler’s transaction util- one stating the number of people that a certain program 1The corresponding principle in psychophysics, known as Weber’s can save, and the other stating the percentage of people Law (or Weber-Fechner Law), states that people’s ability to discrim- that can be saved. They find that when subjects are asked inate between physical stimuli depends on the relative difference be- about their own judgment, they give more importance to tween them and not on the absolute difference. However, this does notnecessarily imply that the same is true when we consider numbers in the absolute number of people saved, but, when subjects decision problems, rather than physical stimuli.
are asked to predict how the average student rates the im- Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 6, No. 2, February 2011 portance of each piece of information, they predict that ing on the proportion saved does not reduce his physical the proportion of lives saved is more important. Hom- well-being.2 On the other hand, making biased decisions burg et al. (2010) study the impact of price increases on about one’s consumption alternatives does affect the de- future purchase behavior and find that the framing of a cision maker’s well-being. This is another reason that we price increase as a percentage leads to a lower likelihood may not observe relative thinking in choice between dif- of a future purchase compared to the framing in absolute ferentiated goods even if proportions play a role in deci- sions about saving lives. Consequently, it is important to The study reported in this article examines whether examine whether relative thinking exists in the context consumers consider relative or absolute price differences of choosing between differentiated goods even though when choosing between differentiated products. The re- we already know that proportions matter in choosing be- sults show that people do not choose between differen- tiated goods by comparing their valuation of the quality As the literature review above suggested, much of the difference to the absolute price difference, as economic literature discussed the context of saving lives, but an- theory prescribes. Instead, when people make purchase other major context that was explored is that of decid- decisions, the relative price difference (measured here as ing whether to spend time to find a cheaper price for the the absolute price difference divided by the price of the same good (either when it is known that such a cheaper high-quality good) plays a crucial role. Consequently, store exists but requires travel, or in the context of price people are willing to pay more for the same quality dif- search where other prices are unknown). This context is ference, when the good’s price is higher. This behavior significantly different from the context of choosing be- represents a decision making bias that was recently de- tween differentiated goods. In the first case, the con- noted “relative thinking” (Azar, 2004). Because choos- sumer buys the exact same good, but can buy it in differ- ing between differentiated goods is so common in real ent stores. In the differentiated goods context, the goods life, this is an important finding about consumer behav- are different (and the store may or may not be the same ior, with implications for research in marketing, decision one).3 This difference results in substantially different science, psychology, economics and other related disci- decision and considerations. The choice between differ- plines, as well as for businesses and managers.
entiated goods requires the consumer to consider to what This study is different from the previous literature de- extent the higher-quality good yields a higher utility for scribed above in several ways. The context of choos- him, and how much money it is worth paying to obtain ing between differentiated goods is very different from the better quality. The decision whether to spend time to the context of choosing between programs to save lives.
find a cheaper price for the same good requires the deci- Consumption of goods and services is different from sav- sion maker to evaluate in monetary terms the value of his ing lives. Comparing number of lives is different from time and effort. Evaluating the value of increased quality comparing prices. Deciding which of two differentiated is very different from estimating the value of one’s time goods to buy is something that an average adult does on a and effort, and it is not clear that a behavior of relative daily basis; almost every time we buy lunch, toothpaste, thinking in the domain of price search or travelling to a bread, etc., we choose among several alternatives. On the cheaper store necessarily implies that it will also exist in other hand, deciding which program to adopt to save lives choices between differentiated goods. Moreover, even in is a decision that most people do not make even once in the context of spending time to find a lower price some a lifetime. Therefore the experience one has in making studies showed that relative thinking is not always present these decisions is vastly different. It could certainly be (e.g., Darke & Freedman, 1993; Darke et al., 1995).
the case that in a decision to save lives, which the sub- This study is also different from the literature discussed ject encounters for the first time in his life, he is biased above in additional ways. Instead of making a binary and is affected by proportions, but in a decision on choos- choice (e.g., between two life-saving programs or be- ing between differentiated goods (something that he did tween driving 20 minutes and spending $5 more), sub- many times), his experience can help him to do the ratio- 2In addition, in some contexts, the proportion of lives saved is also nal thing and focus on the absolute price difference, ig- highly relevant, and this can create a heuristic decision rule that is then noring the irrelevant relative price difference. Moreover, applied also when it is irrelevant. For example, most people would the desire to save lives is motivated by altruism; the lives agree that it is more important to save ten panda bears than ten cows,because the population of Panda bears is smaller and therefore the same saved are of hypothetical people that the subject does not number of lives represents a higher proportion, and this makes sense know personally and saving them does not affect the sub- in the context of endangered species. Similarly, preferences that give ject’s physical well-being. Therefore even if we believe more importance to saving 40 lives in an Amazonian tribe of 50 people that the relevant criterion for decisions about saving lives than to saving 40 lives in a people of hundreds of millions would not beviewed as biased or irrational by most people.
should be the absolute number of saved lives, an exper- 3Also, the literature on comparing prices for the same good focused imental subject who makes a biased decision by focus- on goods, while this study explores both goods and services.
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 6, No. 2, February 2011 jects are asked to provide a price that makes them in- model in which you are interested is offered with different between the two differentiated goods. Conse- two screen sizes: 15" and 13". Assume that all quently, their responses are on a continuous scale and al- other features (including external size and weight) low to compute the amount of money that the subjects are identical across the two models. Also assume view as equivalent to the quality difference. This allows that on an average day you work with the computer to obtain not only qualitative conclusions (e.g., that peo- for about 5 hours, and that you intend to replace it ple are affected by the relative price differences) but also 3 years from today. If the computer with the 15" quantitative measurements of relative thinking. For ex- screen size costs [3750; 11250] Shekels, what is the ample, we can analyze whether multiplying the price by maximal price of the computer with the screen size x also multiplies the valuation of the quality difference by of 13" such that you will prefer it to the computer x (“full relative thinking”) or by less than x (“partial rela- with the larger screen? _________ Shekels tive thinking”). In three scenarios used in the experimentthe data is consistent with full relative thinking, and in 2. Assume that you can do your weekly grocery shop- one scenario with partial relative thinking.
ping in one of two stores, which are at the same dis- Moreover, the four different scenarios used yielded dif- tance from your home. In store A the products are ferent results and I discuss several ideas about the possi- conveniently organized on the shelves and the store ble reasons for these differences. One idea is that relative is spacious, clean, and quiet. Store B is not conve- thinking is weaker when the quality dimension is more niently organized and is congested, dirty, and noisy.
separable from the good, because then the subject can Purchasing the products you want to buy takes you more easily evaluate the value of the additional quality an hour in either store. If the products you want to in isolation from the good and therefore also without be- purchase cost a total of [194; 582] Shekels in store ing affected by the good’s price. Another idea is that in A, what is the maximal amount you will be willing two scenarios we possibly see not only relative thinking to pay in store B such that you will prefer to shop but also additional effects, which are denoted “perceived there instead of in store A? _________ Shekels quality difference effect”, “perceived wealth effect”, and“perceived necessity effect”, and are explained in detail 3. Assume that you want to purchase a bicycle for your daily commute to the university and back (the ridetakes 10 minutes), and you predict that you will usethe bicycles for 3 years. The model in which you are interested comes in either 15 speeds or 5 speeds, andexcept for the number of speeds the two models are To test experimentally how price levels affect consumer identical. If the 15-speeds model costs [475; 1425] behavior regarding price differences between differenti- Shekels, what is the maximal price of the 5-speeds ated products, a questionnaire that includes four different model such that you will prefer it to the 15-speeds decision scenarios was developed. In one treatment the good’s price in the scenario was high and in the other itwas low. This tests how price affects the evaluation of 4. Assume that you want to fly to New-York (one- quality differences.4 In total, 415 subjects participated in way). You found two possible flights. One flight the study.5 The subjects were recruited on the campuses is direct from Tel-Aviv to New-York and it takes 11 of two large Israeli universities, Ben-Gurion University hours. The second flight makes a connection stop of of the Negev and Tel Aviv University. The four scenarios 3 hours in Europe, and the two flight segments take that the subjects answered (translated from the original 11 hours together (so you will arrive in New-York questionnaire that was in Hebrew) were as follows (dif- 14 hours after the departure from Tel-Aviv). The ferences between the low- and high-price treatments are suitcases continue directly to New-York and you do not need to take them out in Europe and check themin again during the connection stop. Other than the 1. Assume that you want to purchase a laptop. The connection the flights are identical. If the directflight costs [$274; $822], what is the maximal price 4Another manipulation was the participation fee paid to subjects.
of the flight with the connection such that you will Half of the subjects received 5 Shekels (about 1.10 US Dollars) for an-swering the questionnaire, while the other half received 15 Shekels. The prefer it to the direct flight? $_________ goal of this manipulation was to examine whether a different participa-tion fee affects the bias of relative thinking. The different participation The four scenarios are in different consumption cate- fee did not have a statistically significant effect. Therefore in the rest of gories, in order to ascertain that if relative thinking is de- the article the participation fee treatments are combined.
5A few subjects did not answer all questions. Therefore the number tected, it is a general and robust phenomenon. In addition, of observations in each scenario is slightly less than 415.
the scenarios chosen are related to products and services Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 6, No. 2, February 2011 that students are familiar with, so that their responses are hypothesis is that people consider also (or exclusively) as informed as possible (asking them about a purchase of relative price differences, and as a result are willing to a house, for example, is less likely to relate to their life pay more for the same quality difference when the goods’ experience than asking about the purchase of a bike or prices are higher. If this hypothesis is correct, the VOQ grocery products). Subjects were generally in their mid- should be higher in the high-price treatment; this leads to twenties (because of compulsory military service in Is- rael, people rarely start university before they are 20–21years old, and many start a few years later). The ratio Hypothesis 1: Relative price differences affect choices between the prices in the two price treatments was three between differentiated goods; specifically, the amount in all scenarios in order to allow a comparison between people are willing to pay for a constant improvement in the scenarios later on. This constant ratio was chosen to quality is increasing in the good’s price.
be three as a compromise between two opposite require-ments. One is that the prices should be sufficiently differ- Table 1 presents summary statistics of the VOQ in each ent to allow to observe relative thinking if people indeed scenario and price treatment, and the results of the t-test exhibit such a bias. This requires that the ratio between for difference in means and of the Mann-Whitney U test.
the two prices is not too small. The other requirement The strong positive effect of the good’s price on the VOQ is that the prices are reasonable given the range of mar- is obvious: the VOQ is much higher in the high-price ket prices for the relevant goods, which can encourage treatment, and the two statistical tests in all four scenarios more accurate responses from the subjects. This limits provide p-values below 0.0001, suggesting that the differ- the possible ratio between the prices. The ratio of three ence between the two price treatments is statistically sig- allowed the prices in the questions to be reasonable and nificant. This means that Hypothesis 1 is supported very yet it yielded a strong and statistically significant effect of strongly by the data in the experiment.
relative thinking, so this ratio seems to have been a good We may ask whether the VOQ in the responses reflects the real preferences of the subjects, or whether the truepreferences are different but for some reason responses 3 Hypotheses, results and discus- deviate systematically from them and reflect also some sort of a scaling bias. One reason for thinking that the responses reflect true preferences is that, when responsesare affected by a scaling bias, they are likely to be sen- 3.1 Relative thinking with differentiated sitive to the elicitation method, but the literature docu- ments behavior of relative thinking in studies that elicitedresponses in many ways. For example, Tversky and Kah- In each of the four questions in the experiment, the sub- neman (1981) asked subjects whether they would drive ject is given the price of the high-quality good, and is 20 minutes to another store for a $5 savings, and obtained asked to provide the maximal price of the low-quality results that show that subjects considered the percentage good for which he prefers the latter. This means that his savings. Another reason to believe that subjects reveal response is the price of the low-quality good for which he their true preferences is the evidence that firms respond in is indifferent between the two goods, because up to this their pricing decisions to relative thinking (Azar, 2010).
price he prefers the low-quality good, and for any higher If the findings on relative thinking were artifacts of exper- price he prefers the high-quality good. Consequently, the iments that do not reflect true preferences and therefore difference between the subject’s response and the price of are not present in real markets, firms would not respond the high-quality good represents the subject’s monetary valuation of the quality difference between the goods.
Given the strong positive effect of the good’s price on This valuation, denoted by VOQ (for “value of quality”), the VOQ, it is interesting to examine whether multiplying is the amount of money that gives the subject the same the price by three (in all four scenarios this is the ratio be- utility as the utility difference between the two goods, ac- tween the two price treatments) also multiplies the VOQ cording to the subject’s stated preferences (of course it is by three. If consumer decisions are affected only by rel- not the money per se that gives utility, but whatever the ative price differences (“full relative thinking”), then the VOQ in the high-price treatment should be about three If people behave according to the principle implied by times the VOQ in the low-price treatment. If both rela- economic theory, comparing the absolute price difference tive and absolute price differences affect consumer deci- to their increased utility from the better product, then the sions (“partial relative thinking”), then the VOQ should VOQ should be similar regardless of the treatment; the increase less than the price increase (because of the mod- good’s price should not affect the VOQ. The alternative erating effect of the absolute price difference), i.e., the Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 6, No. 2, February 2011 Table 1: Value of quality (VOQ) in the various scenarios.
The p-values reported are the two-tailed p-values of the t-test for difference in means (allowing for unequal variance)and of the Mann-Whitney U test between the low-price and the high-price treatments in each scenario.
VOQ should increase by a factor of less than three. From means that multiplying the price by three increases the Table 1 we can compute the ratio between the means VOQ on average by a factor of less than three. This pat- in the high-price and low-price treatments. This ratio is tern is consistent with partial relative thinking—people equal to 3.25 in the laptop scenario, 2.67 in the grocery being affected by both absolute and relative price dif- scenario, 3.26 in the bike scenario and 2.19 in the flight ferences. The results in the flight scenario being differ- ent from the other scenarios suggest that some contexts To test formally whether the VOQ increases by the encourage relative thinking more than others. Conse- same factor as the price, a variable denoted REL-VOQ quently, in contexts that are highly susceptible to relative (REL for “relative”) was computed as the ratio between thinking, we may observe full relative thinking, but in the VOQ provided by the subject and the price included other contexts relative thinking may be weaker, leading in the scenario. For example, if a subject in the low- price flight scenario (where the direct flight costs $274) It should be emphasized, however, that even partial answers that he prefers the flight with the connection up relative thinking is inconsistent with the traditional as- to a price of $250, then REL-VOQ = $24/$274 = 0.088.
sumptions of economic theory, because when choosing If people exhibit full relative thinking, the value of REL- between differentiated goods one should consider only VOQ should be the same in the low-price and high-price absolute price differences, as explained in more detail in treatments. This equality is tested for each scenario sep- the introduction. The results in the three scenarios that arately using both a t-test for difference in means and a are consistent with full relative thinking are even more Mann-Whitney U test. The results of these tests are re- striking. While economic theory suggests that only ab- solute price differences should matter, in these scenarios In scenarios 1, 2, and 3 we cannot reject at the 5% sig- we cannot reject the hypothesis that absolute differences nificance level the hypothesis that the variable REL-VOQ have no effect at all and only relative price differences has the same mean in both price treatments. This means that in these scenarios the data are consistent with full rel-ative thinking—i.e., people consider only relative price differences. In scenario 4 (the flight scenario), on the other hand, we can reject the hypothesis that the mean ofREL-VOQ is the same in the two price treatments. REL- A closer look at the data shows that also the grocery store VOQ is higher in the low-price treatment there, which scenario exhibits less relative thinking than the laptop and Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 6, No. 2, February 2011 Table 2: Full or partial relative thinking? ∗ Allowing for unequal variance.
bike scenarios. As mentioned earlier, the ratio between that were present in the grocery store. This is not the case the mean VOQ in the high-price treatment and the low- with a laptop screen or a bike’s speeds. Therefore also in price treatment is equal to 3.25 in the laptop scenario, the grocery scenario the quality dimension is more sepa- 2.67 in the grocery scenario, 3.26 in the bike scenario and rable from the good than in the laptop and bike scenarios, 2.19 in the flight scenario. The ratios of the medians of which may be the reason why relative thinking is weaker the two treatments are 3.00 in the laptop scenario, 1.86 in the grocery scenario, 3.40 in the bike scenario and 2.04 in Second, in the laptop and bike scenarios we possibly the flight scenario. We can see that the ratio in the laptop see additional effects on top of relative thinking. This and bike scenarios is at least three in all cases, whereas in can also explain why the ratio of VOQ in these scenar- the grocery and flight scenario it is always less than three.
ios is even larger than the ratio of the prices (three). Let That is, in the laptop and bike scenarios the ratio in VOQ us call the effects “perceived quality difference effect”, exceeds the price ratio between the treatments (which is “perceived wealth effect”, and “perceived necessity ef- three), whereas in the grocery and flight scenarios the op- fect”. The “perceived quality difference effect” means that the subject perceives a higher quality difference be- Why is the effect of the price treatment stronger in the tween the low-quality and high-quality goods (e.g., 13" laptop and bike scenarios than in the grocery and flight and 15" screen laptops) when the good’s price is higher, scenarios? Several potential reasons might contribute to because he infers from a higher price that the good’s qual- these results. First, when the quality dimension is more ity is higher (even though the experiment is between sub- easily separable from the good, this may trigger relative jects), and then he attributes a higher value to the dif- thinking less, because the subject can more easily eval- ference between the low-quality and high-quality goods.6 uate the value of the additional quality in isolation from For example, a subject who considers the expensive lap- the good. When he can think about the quality separately top may assume that it is of a very high quality and at- from the good, the subject may tend less to determine the tributes a high value to the difference between 13" and value of quality based on the good’s price, which is the 15" screens, whereas a subject who considers the cheaper source of relative thinking here. We can think about the laptop assumes a lower quality of the laptop and there- value of wasting three hours of our time in an airport and fore also of the screen, and consequently he also values separate this characteristic of the flight more easily than the difference between 13" and 15" by a smaller amount.
we can separate screen size from a laptop or the number A similar argument can be made about the quality of the of speeds from a bike. We are more used to considering speeds in the bike.7 However, a similar logic is irrelevant the value of our time in isolation from a flight than we are in the grocery store and flight scenarios. The value of used to considering the value of speeds in isolation froma bike, for example. This may be the reason that in the 6See for example Hamilton and Chernev (2010) on the impact of flight scenario we observe a weaker relative thinking than price image on consumer evaluation of products.
7An important reason why a higher perceived quality may result in in the laptop and bike scenarios. In the grocery store sce- a higher value for a certain improvement (e.g., in screen size) is that a nario, the store’s organization and cleanliness are clearly subject may think that he will use the good more often and for a longer an inherent part of the shopping experience, but they are period when its quality is higher. To mitigate this possibility, the word- not part of the goods themselves. Once we finished our ing of the scenarios states clearly how much time the subject shouldexpect to use the good (e.g., five hours a day for three years in the lap- shopping trip and we are driving back home, we have the top scenario, and a ten-minute ride twice a day for three years in the same goods in our baskets, regardless of the conditions Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 6, No. 2, February 2011 avoiding a connection is not higher when you pay more The “perceived necessity effect” is the idea that, when for the flight ticket.8 The value of spending an hour in a a subject is being told that he wants to spend a lot of more pleasant store is unrelated to how much you pay in money on a good, he may interpret it to mean that the good is very important for him, and as a result also be The “perceived wealth effect” captures the idea that a willing to spend more money to upgrade the good to its subject who is told to imagine spending a lot of money on high-quality version. For example, a subject may think a good may say to himself something along the lines of “if “If I spend a large amount of 11250 Shekels on a lap- I am so wealthy that I can spend so much on a good, then top, then it must be very important to me, in which case it I can also spend a lot on getting the better version of that also worth a lot to get the 15" screen”. The wording of the good”. That is, the higher the price the subject is asked to laptop and bike scenarios that includes how often and for consider, the more wealthy the subject imagines himself.
how many years the subject should expect to use the good This is more relevant in these situations where the prices are supposed to mitigate this effect, but possibly it still ex- that people pay for a good are more closely related to ists, at least for some subjects. In the flight scenario this their wealth. People who buy more expensive laptops and perceived necessity effect is irrelevant. First, similar to bikes are probably wealthier on average than those who the argument made earlier, the flight’s price may be a re- buy the cheaper versions.9 Therefore telling a subject to sult of issues other than the flight’s importance. Second, imagine buying a 11250-Shekels laptop may result in him even if one views a certain flight as important, it still does viewing himself as richer than someone who considers not mean that avoiding a connection becomes important buying a 3750-Shekels laptop. Consequently, the former as well. In the grocery store scenario, spending more does subject may also be willing to pay more for the upgrade not mean more important purchases (for similar reasons from 13" to 15". In the case of flights, on the other hand, to those discussed earlier), and even if one purchases im- what someone pays is usually determined mostly by the portant goods it does not imply that the convenience of question to which destination he wants to fly and in which dates; his wealth does not have the same effect that it hasin other consumption categories. Similarly, in the gro-cery shopping scenario making a larger purchase can re- sult from many different reasons that are unrelated to the consumer’s wealth. For example, a wealthier consumermay eat in restaurants more often and therefore purchase The article examines decision making in a very com- less in the grocery store. The amount spent can also re- mon consumer problem, in which a consumer is faced flect the quantity of food that one consumes, which vary with differentiated goods or services that differ in price significantly between people in a manner that is unrelated and quality. Indeed, almost any time we want to pur- to wealth. Some students go to their parents’ house every chase something we can choose from several alternatives weekend (this is common for Israeli students) and then with different prices and quality levels. The study finds a they do not need as much food so they can purchase less.
strong decision making bias: when people consider dif- Some consumers buy in the grocery store also non-food ferentiated goods or services they are affected by relative items such as toothpaste and soap, while others purchase price differences even in situations where economic the- such items in other stores. Some people may purchase ory suggests that only absolute price differences matter, a also for their roommate, or shop less frequently, result- behavior that was denoted “relative thinking”. This result ing in larger amounts per shopping trip. Consequently, is documented in four different scenarios taken from dif- the amount the subject is told to imagine spending in the ferent consumption categories. In three of the four sce- grocery store should not affect how rich the subject views narios, the hypothesis that people exhibit “full relative himself. Therefore in the flight and grocery store scenar- thinking” (they consider only relative price differences ios the possible effect of perceived wealth is irrelevant.
and pay no attention at all to absolute price differences) 8First, the price of a flight ticket is not so much a signal about the cannot be rejected. In one scenario there is evidence that airline quality as a laptop or bike price is about the good’s quality; qual- people exhibit “partial relative thinking”—being affected ity differences between airlines are not as big as differences between by both relative and absolute price differences. Some computers or bikes, and price variation for airline tickets is often more ideas about the possible reasons for differences between a function of demand and supply conditions, the time of the year andsimilar consideration than of the airline quality. Second, even if the the scenarios are discussed. One idea is that relative subject does associate a higher flight price with a higher quality, it is thinking is weaker when the quality dimension is more not clear why the airline quality should have any impact on the value of separable from the good, because then the subject can avoiding spending three hours in a connection stop.
more easily evaluate the value of the additional quality 9It should be pointed out, however, that in the bike scenario even the more expensive bike, which was slightly above $300, is relatively in isolation from the good and therefore also without be- ing affected by the good’s price. Another idea is that in Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 6, No. 2, February 2011 the laptop and bike scenarios we possibly see additional even if the absolute amount saved is the same. Conse- effects in addition to relative thinking; these effects are quently, they behave as if their search or transportation denoted “perceived quality difference effect”, “perceived costs are an increasing function of the good’s price. Once wealth effect”, and “perceived necessity effect”, and are firms respond to this behavior, price dispersion indeed be- comes positively correlated with the good’s price.
The results thus challenge the common assumptions in One additional example for how businesses may re- economic theory about how people choose between dif- spond to relative thinking is in the context of the opti- ferentiated goods. Consequently, this study improves our mal set of products to offer to customers. Suppose that a understanding of consumer decision making and offers firm can enhance the variety of colors in which its good important implications for research in marketing, deci- (e.g., a car or an eyeglasses frame) is offered, but it is not sion science, psychology and economics, and to busi- sure whether to increase the variety of a cheap model or a nesses and managers. Economic models, for example, more expensive one. According to relative thinking, it is might yield better predictions if they account for this be- likely that consumers will be willing to add more money havior and not assume that consumers only consider ab- to get their favorite color when the good’s price is higher.
solute price differences. This is particularly relevant in Consequently, relative thinking suggests that increasing models dealing with horizontal or vertical differentiation, the color variety for the more expensive model might be optimal pricing, competitive strategy, or advertising.
more attractive than if we ignore relative thinking. Of Azar (2008a), for example, uses a two-period game- course, there are other factors at play as well; the income theoretic model of location differentiation in which he in- of the average consumer of the more expensive model corporates relative thinking of consumers. Relative think- might be higher, for example, also leading to a higher ing in this framework causes consumers to make less ef- willingness to pay for a desired color in the more expen- fort to save a constant amount when they buy more expen- sive model. The quantity sold of each model is also an sive goods. This is modeled by assuming that consumers important consideration, and possibly the cheaper mod- behave as if their transportation costs are increasing in els are sold more often. Relative thinking is not the only the good’s price. As a result, the firms raise prices in or- consideration, but it can also have an effect on the optimal der to increase the perceived transportation costs of con- set of products the firm should choose to manufacture, sumers, which consequently softens competition, allows and therefore it should be taken into account.
higher profits, and reduces consumer surplus.
Another implication of relative thinking applies to multi-product retailers. Azar (2008b) analyzes the pric- ing decisions of multi-product retailers who respond torelative thinking of consumers. In his model, some con- Aalto-Setälä, V. (2003). Price dispersion and search costs sumers buy only one good and others purchase two dif- in grocery retailing. Working paper, National Con- ferent goods. He finds that the markup on the good with sumer Research Centre, Helsinki, Finland.
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Journal of Economic Psychology, 29, 684–697. Various studies (e.g., Aalto-Setälä, 2003; Xing, in Azar, O. H. (2008b). Optimal strategy of multi-product press) show that price dispersion is strongly correlated retailers with relative thinking and reference prices.
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Source: http://mars.smu.edu.sg/SJDM/11/10921/jdm10921.pdf