Network Games under Strategic ComplementaritiesMohamed Belhaj, Yann Bramoullé and Frédéric Deroïan*Abstract : We study network games with linear best-replies and strategic complementarities. Weassume that actions are continuous but bounded from above. We show that there is always aunique equilibrium. We …nd that two key features of these games under small network e¤ectsmay not hold when n
Debt-trap Realising the urgent need to show heavily indebted farmers a way out of their problem so that they are dissuaded from committing suicide and thereby plunging their families into even greater misery, MASR has prepared a booklet explaining the legal protections available to indebted persons. This booklet, translated into Punjabi and Hindi, has been much in demand since it was first pu
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