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“The U.S. Approach to North Korean Denuclearization”
Most international observers regard U.S. policy toward North Korea as the key, or at least one of the keys, to resolving the North Korean nuclear problem. Unfortunately, the U.S. approach to North Korean denuclearization over the past two decades has often been characterized by policy incoherence and ineffectiveness due to sporadic attention, ill-informed leadership, and internal division. Most American leaders regard North Korea’s nuclear ambitions as a serious threat to American interests but not nearly on a par with, for example, concerns about the Middle East. Top American executive branch officials typically know relatively little about North Korea and generally do not exercise effective supervision over subordinates regarding policy toward the country. It is thus not surprising that American policy toward North Korea has undergone numerous changes historically and been unable to prevent the development of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. In this regard, the administration of President George W. Bush is the object of intense criticism by American and international observers, and deservedly so, but many of the problems of U.S. policy toward North Korea are endemic to the American foreign policy apparatus and decision-making process. As an examination of the history of U.S. policy toward the North Korean nuclear problem is beyond the scope of my presentation, I will focus on an analysis of President Bush’s approach to North Korea and its effect on the Six-Party Talks. I will conclude with some suggestions as to how U.S. policy should be modified to make the Six-Party Talks more effective. A Review of Bush Administration Policy To understand the policy of the Bush administration toward North Korea, it is essential to give adequate weight to three basic points: first, the enormous power of an American president, as an individual, to determine foreign policy; second, President Bush’s extremely negative view of North Korea and its leadership; and, third, President Bush’s rejection of dialogue with states he regards as “evil.” President Bush’s decision to invade Iraq eloquently illustrates the first point, with no need of elaboration. Regarding the second point, President Bush has spoken repeatedly of his “loathing” of North Korean leader Kim Jung Il and his regime. I would “Prospects for Denuclearization of North Korea Through the Six Party Talks” Public Forum April 24, 2007 add that there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of such statements or to believe that President Bush’s fundamental outlook on North Korea will change. Finally, regarding the third point, it is instructive to note that President Bush continues to reject dialogue with Iran and Syria, in spite of the disastrous situation in Iraq and the massive criticism of his stance on the part not only of most Democrats but also many Republicans. In President Bush’s first term of office, he gave precedence to so-called “hardliners” in the formulation of North Korea policy. Before 9/11, he did issue a statement, in June 2001, calling for comprehensive bilateral talks with North Korea. However, reflecting President Bush’s own views, it included issues and took a tone likely to result in its rejection by North Korea. Essentially, it represented a papering over of differences within the top ranks of the administration, with President Bush favoring a hard-line approach and his Secretary of State, Colin Powell, urging a more moderate, pragmatic policy. After 9/11, President Bush put the concept of an “axis of evil” at the heart of American foreign policy and included North Korea within that axis. Even so, by late spring 2002, North Korea finally indicated a willingness to engage in talks with the Bush administration. Coincidentally, however, the U.S. intelligence community concluded about that time that North Korea was covertly pursuing a uranium enrichment program, a fundamental violation of its commitments to the U.S., the Republic of Korea, and the international community. Ideologues in the Bush administration, and apparently the President himself, regarded that program not, as some critics say, as an opportunity but as a moral obligation to abandon the Clinton administration’s 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea. Two current points of public debate – whether the U.S. intelligence about the uranium enrichment program was exaggerated and whether the North Koreans later privately acknowledged the program to U.S. officials – seem to have been essentially irrelevant in terms of President Bush’s thinking. It was clear at the time that the North Koreans were pursuing uranium enrichment at least to some degree. That was all President Bush and his most trusted advisers needed to know. How advanced the program was, was not the point, and what the North Koreans said about it was even less a consideration – since President Bush believed they could not be trusted. Whether the North Koreans, for their part, regarded the U.S. confronting them with its knowledge of the uranium enrichment program as an opportunity or as an obligation, they also choose to abandon the Agreed Framework, and proceeded to reverse its limited accomplishments with alacrity. The Bush administration, internally divided and unable to engage in serious policy debate, did not anticipate the speed or the scope of the North Korean response. The consequence was that, by early 2003, North Korea had resumed production of plutonium, which could be used for nuclear weapons. It was precisely this situation that had so raised tensions on the Korean Peninsula in 1993-1994. “Prospects for Denuclearization of North Korea Through the Six Party Talks” Public Forum April 24, 2007 The U.S. stood by, more or less helplessly, as North Korean reprocessing continued, while most of North Korea’s neighbors, including the government of the United States’ South Korean ally, blamed the debacle almost as much on the U.S. as on North Korea. Secretary of State Powell, as the responsible official within the Bush administration, was confronted by a serious problem. With the U.S. invasion of Iraq only months away, he had to find a way to address and, if possible, limit the North Korean nuclear breakout. Secretary Powell had few options. After the discovery of the uranium enrichment program, President Bush no longer supported bilateral negotiations with North Korea. Also, although President Bush routinely said he would take no options off the table, there is no evidence he seriously considered a military strike against North Korea’s nuclear program. Moreover, with the U.S. invasion of Iraq looming, such an option would have been riskier than ever. Finally, the U.S. had been implementing numerous economic and trade and other sanctions against North Korea since the Korean War; there were few sanctions options remaining and they were unlikely to have much effect, especially without the support of North Korea’s neighbors. It was in this context that Secretary Powell successfully pursued the establishment of the multilateral talks on the North Korean nuclear problem in 2003 that soon became the Six-Party Talks, with China as the host and chair. President Bush and his ideological advisers were willing, reluctantly, to sit at the same table with North Korea, but not to engage in the give and take of true negotiations. To a considerable extent, they genuinely believed that North Korea would use bilateral talks with the U.S. to divide the U.S. from its allies in Northeast Asia; that North Korea could not be trusted to keep agreements without massive pressure from its neighbors and the U.S.; and that China could to force North Korea to give up its nuclear programs. Essentially, the Bush administration regarded the Six-Party talks not as a negotiating forum but as a mechanism to ensure that North Korea’s neighbors, especially China, would bring their leverage to bear against North Korea to give up its nuclear program. Unfortunately, this conception of the Six-Party Talks on the part of the Bush administration was and remains deeply flawed. While it is correct to say that all of North Korea’s neighbors are united in the position that North Korea should not have nuclear weapons, the PRC, Russia, the Republic of Korea, and, at times, some in Japan have strongly tended to blame the U.S. as much as North Korea for the current situation. In addition to these fundamental differences among the parties about the appropriate U.S. approach toward North Korea, the parties also have other, non-Korean Peninsula issues with the U.S. that they consider in deciding how and to what extent to cooperate with the U.S. regarding North Korea. Some factors encourage them to support the U.S. approach while others do the opposite. “Prospects for Denuclearization of North Korea Through the Six Party Talks” Public Forum April 24, 2007 The balance of these factors means that China, in particular, is willing to host and chair the talks and continue to work intensively to prevent their outright collapse, but is not willing to move beyond censure of, and limited pressure on, North Korea toward measures whose collateral damage could include the collapse of the North Korean regime. Changes in President Bush’s Approach toward North Korea In recent months, however, many observers have noted what they regard as a strategic change in President Bush’s approach toward North Korea. Some hailed the change and expressed the hope that it would lead to a breakthrough in the Six-Party Talks. On the other hand, critics such as former senior Bush administration John Bolton condemned the change as a serious mistake. The assumption of a strategic U.S. change, held by both some supporters and some critics of such change, is mistaken on two counts. First, the apparent change in U.S. policy toward North Korea in President Bush’s second term has been grossly exaggerated by many commentators. Second, success in the Six-Party Talks depends on much more than just the U.S. position or even both the U.S. and North Korean positions. President Bush has of course significantly changed his approach toward North Korea in recent months. The limited bilateral negotiations he has allowed with North Korea and such concessions as the release of frozen North Korean funds would have been unthinkable during his first term. But there is no evidence that President Bush has changed his basic attitude toward North Korea or his goal of ensuring that it completely, verifiably, and irreversibly dismantles its nuclear weapons programs. Due to the North Korean reaction, U.S. officials no longer use the initials “CVID,” but they continue to make public statements affirming, in effect, that the substance of the U.S. demands remain the same. Bush administration officials have also recently reaffirmed the importance the U.S. attaches to North Korea’s human rights situation. It is worth recalling that, during the first two years of President Bush’s second term, he began pursuing a much tougher approach toward North Korea, including the use of so-called “defensive measures” such as de facto global financial sanctions against North Korea. It appears that the North Korean nuclear weapon test last fall, the worsening debacle in Iraq, the Republicans’ loss of control of Congress, and the related departure of a number of the most influential ideologues in the administration set the stage for President Bush’s recent policy change. It is in this setting that Condoleezza Rice, now Secretary of State and responsible for North Korea policy, became able to use her personal relationship with President – a relationship that her predecessor did not enjoy – to persuade him to allow significant adjustments on an ad hoc basis. “Prospects for Denuclearization of North Korea Through the Six Party Talks” Public Forum April 24, 2007 Some observers, however, point to Bush administration policy in support of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula as reason to believe that President Bush has made a fundamental, strategic decision to negotiate full diplomatic relations with North Korea even if it does not entirely abandon its nuclear weapons program. Such an argument is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of American attitudes toward and interests in North Korea. In fact, there is no reason to believe that President Bush – or any American president, for that matter – would agree to normal diplomatic relations with a North Korean regime abhorred by most Americans for its human rights violations while it still retains nuclear weapons, or is even suspected of retaining nuclear weapons. The current U.S. concept for a peace regime was developed during the period when Six-Party Talks were stalled and appears likely to have been sold to the President as a means to persuade North Korea to take a more forthcoming approach in the nuclear talks – not for a broader strategic purpose. Moreover, it should be noted that the U.S. has never been opposed to the principle of establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. engaged in international talks on that subject as early as 1954 and as recently as the Four-Party Talks of 1997-1999. Such talks have never made headway due to North Korean insistence on, in effect, the U.S. severing of its strategic relationship with the Republic of Korea. North Korea does not appear to have changed its position in that regard. If peace talks are held, it will almost certainly call for an end to U.S.-ROK combined military exercises, a withdrawal of U.S. forces from the South, and an end to the United States’ nuclear umbrella for the ROK. This is unlikely to be acceptable in the foreseeable future to any U.S. government, or any South Korean government, for that matter. North Korea may well hope that the U.S. will eventually accept it as a nuclear weapons state, as the U.S. has done with both India and Pakistan. But the cases of India and Pakistan differ in basic ways from North Korea. If North Korea is counting on such an outcome, it has made a most serious strategic miscalculation. No discussion of the Six-Party Talks would be complete with only a discussion of U.S. policy toward North Korea, because North Korea’s attitude is even more fundamental that U.S. policy to ending North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. North Korea has made it clear that, after its nuclear weapons test, it expects to negotiate as, and be treated as, a nuclear weapons state. As a consequence, its demands will increase. It will not consider abandoning its nuclear ambitions for the one million “Prospects for Denuclearization of North Korea Through the Six Party Talks” Public Forum April 24, 2007 tons of heavy fuel oil specified in the February 13 agreement. Among its many demands will be the construction of light water reactors. There will be limits, however, to the concessions President Bush is prepared to make. How will he react to such additional North Korean demands? Will he reject them and refuse to make further concessions? Or will he grudgingly agree for lack of better options? President Bush may make some additional concessions in the hope that the talks may yet achieve their goal, but I believe that at some point he will almost certainly say “no more.” In response, North Korea will blame the U.S. for its “hostility,” and the talks will stall. Even then, however, officials of all of the parties, including the U.S., will likely continue publicly to hold out hope for the ultimate success of the talks. The U.S. will do so because it lacks better options and will not wish to acknowledge the fundamental problems in the Six-Party Talks; most of the other parties are concerned about the course that the U.S. might take if the Six-Party Talks were abandoned, either for strategic or domestic political reasons, or both. We do not know for certain what Kim Jung Il’s calculations were in the decision to develop nuclear weapons. But we do know that he and his top advisors are well informed and rational. The North Korean leadership probably believes that nuclear weapons serve three basic strategic aims. First, they check international pressures, not only from the U.S. but also from China, Japan, and elsewhere. Second, they help to correct the long-term power imbalance between North Korea and South Korea, which has stronger conventional forces, an immensely stronger economy, domestic stability, and international standing. Finally, they bolster Kim Jung Il’s personal position within the North Korean system and the stability of the regime. Some observers would question such an analysis. They note that North Korea is reforming and that North Korean leaders view nuclear weapons primarily as a bargaining chip. North Korea is indeed changing, but painfully slowly. The North Korean leadership clearly fears an existential threat to its position if the society is opened to the outside world. The argument that North Korea is only using nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip appears increasingly unlikely in view of the North Korean nuclear weapons test. As DPRK First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju said after the test, do you think we have tested a nuclear weapon only to give them up. Others would note that North Korea has come under enormous international pressure as a result of its nuclear weapon test. But such an argument overestimates the international pressure placed on North Korea after the test. China was certainly angered by North Korea’s actions but has not applied great pressure to the country. The ROK has “Prospects for Denuclearization of North Korea Through the Six Party Talks” Public Forum April 24, 2007 already resumed aid and continues to hope to expand investments in North Korea. Russia supported the UN resolution but little more. Only Japan has adopted sanctions against North Korea but more in response to the abductee issue than the nuclear weapons test. Certainly North Korea has suffered great opportunity costs by its behavior over the years, now including the nuclear weapons test. But North Korea shows little appreciation of such losses. Moreover, North Korea has long been accustomed to weathering international pressure, secure in its experience that such pressures generally do not last long and that, in any event, North Korea’s neighbors have never been fully united against its misbehavior. The U.S. decision to approve the return of all BDA monies to North Korea undoubtedly reinforced such thinking on the part of the North Korean leadership. This situation underlines two fundamental points. First, there is no alternative to a diplomatic approach to resolving the challenges posed by North Korea. Second, no diplomatic approach can be effective without much greater unity of purpose among North Korea’s neighbors, including the United States, and the development of a serious, long-term strategy based on such unity and cooperation among the five. The exact content of a five-party consensus will be less important than the fact of unity, which would be unprecedented and would potentially have a profound impact on North Korea. The U.S. would need to make substantial changes to its current approach to North Korea to facilitate such a five-party consensus. It would need, for example, to reassure the other four that it would not take unilateral steps that might threaten their basic interests. Other parties would, in turn, need to show that they are willing to apply concerted pressure on the North Korean leadership while offering it a credible way out of its dilemmas. Some will argue that such an approach is unrealistic. I readily concede that it offers no guarantee of full-fledged success in the short- to mid-term. In the meantime, it would, however, at least facilitate placing greater limits on the damage that North Korea could do in the region and globally. In the long term, it would offer the best hope of resolving not only the North Korean nuclear problem, but also the fundamental challenges posed by the anachronistic system in North Korea, of which the nuclear problem is but a symptom. In any event, such an effort is more realistic than the Six-Party Talks as now being pursued. “Prospects for Denuclearization of North Korea Through the Six Party Talks” Public Forum April 24, 2007 Some will also argue that the search for a five-party consensus would take too long to accomplish results. I would ask, “Compared to what?” At the current rate, the Six-Party Talks will probably last forever without achieving North Korea’s denuclearization. Finally, if it were not for North Korea, a vitally needed Northeast Asian regional diplomatic and security mechanism would have been set up years ago. The problem is that the U.S. will not accept North Korean membership in such a group as long as North Korea has nuclear weapons, but several of the other parties remain reluctant to establish such a group while excluding North Korea. A U.S. effort to forge a five-party consensus could lead to a solution to the North Korean nuclear problem and the establishment of a Six-Party (or Seven-Party, including Mongolia) security mechanism. If North Korea nevertheless failed to denuclearize, under such a scenario, the five would probably agree to establish a regional mechanism among themselves. Coordination of the security, political, economic, energy, and environmental problems of Northeast Asia is too important to be allowed to be derailed by the anachronistic regime in North Korea. It is time not only for the U.S. but for the other states of the region to take a serious, long-term, cooperative approach to all of the problems in the region. “Prospects for Denuclearization of North Korea Through the Six Party Talks” Public Forum April 24, 2007

Source: http://www.asiafoundation.or.kr/document/TAF_Six%20Party%20Talks_David%20Straub.pdf